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AT A TENDER AGE: VIOLENT YOUTH AND JUVENILE JUSTICE. By 
Rita Kramer. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1988. Pp. viii, 309. 
$18.95. 
Rita Kramer1 thinks violent youth need less due process and more 
swift and certain punishment. Her view of juvenile justice is shared by 
many adults who are increasingly appalled by the brutality of adoles-
cent criminals. The extreme reaction of one Detroit judge was de-
scribed by a news reporter: 
The presiding judge ... Michael Talbot of Detroit Recorder's Court, was 
so exasperated by the case that in sentencing the teen-ager to life in 
prison in solitary confinement, he said, "My only regret is that this state 
does not have capital punishment and that the state will have to provide 
room and board for life." 
The case changed the judge's view of justice, he said later. "I'm at 
the point where I don't care if this person goes to community college in 
prison and tries to make a little something of himself," Judge Talbot 
said. "I'm thinking of the victims these days."2 
Much of At A Tender Age consists of anecdotal material gleaned 
from interviews with juvenile criminals and professionals working in 
the juvenile justice system. The many uncensored conversations re-
counted regularly induce a skipped heartbeat. Kramer relies heavily 
on gory detail to provoke a sense of outrage at the incompetence of the 
existing system. The book opens with a vivid description of a brutal 
beating and gang rape committed by three teens in New York's Cen-
tral Park in August of 1984 (pp. 1-2). Many similar accounts of inhu-
man crimes are interspersed throughout the book, as if the author is 
attempting by repetition to persuade the reader of how horrible violent 
youth really are. 
In many instances the teenagers described had recently escaped 
from minimum security detention or had been released to their homes 
prior to committing violent crimes. To illustrate the problem of vio-
lent-youth-at-large, Kramer tells the story of fifteen-year-old Shavod 
Jones (pp. 21-24). Jones was arrested for and pied guilty to armed 
robbery. He had been arrested several times previously for violent 
crimes, but the presiding judge had no access to the prior records, as 
they were sealed by law. 3 The judge released Jones after being assured 
1. A writer focusing on family issues, Rita Kramer's other books include: IN DEFENSE OF 
THE FAMILY: RAISING CHILDREN IN AMERICA TODAY (1983) and MARIA MONTESSORI: A 
BIOGRAPHY (1978). 
2. Wilkerson, Urban Homicide Rates in U.S. Up Sharply in 1986, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, 
at Al4, col. 3. 
3. New York law mandates that juvenile records be kept confidential to avoid stigmatizing 
the young. See pp. 221-25. 
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the boy would soon enter a residential treatment facility. Shortly 
thereafter Jones shot and paralyzed a police officer who confronted 
Jones during an attempted bicycle theft. Kramer insists that Jones 
didn't "fall through the cracks" of the juvenile system, but in fact was 
a typical result of an obsolete system designed for truants and prank-
sters, not vicious criminals. As Kramer describes it, "When the Fam-
ily Court Act was written in 1962, delinquents were for the most part 
petty thieves, troublemakers, disobedient truants whom their parents 
complained they couldn't control" (p. 64). 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, 4 a watershed 
opinion governing juvenile proceedings. The Court held that several 
components of criminal due process must be made available to 
juveniles; a central holding made appointment of cqunsel constitution-
ally mandatory.5 Kramer believes that Gault's provision for minimum 
safeguards has been carried to extremes, to the point where "[the juve-
nile's] due process rights as an accused in danger of being deprived of 
his liberty have taken precedence over the idea of his need to be re-
trained, rehabilitated, salvaged, returned whole to the community" (p . 
. 73). She decries the "liberty" obtained for young criminals by their 
counsel, arguing that liberty for these youths means simply returning 
to the violent streets which engendered their problems. 
Kramer and many of her interviewees castigate the Legal Aid Soci-
ety6 for perverting the Gault decision. Kramer concludes, "[T]he orig-
inal intent oflegal representation for ... young lawbreakers [has] been 
corrupted .... [T]heir real interests [are] often sacrificed to their legal-
istic entitlements" (p. 86). "[T]he Legal Aid philosophy," she claims, 
" ... has pushed for granting juveniles all of the rights of adults with 
none of the sanctions" (p. 237). Another critic, James Payne, Chief of 
Family Court Corporation Counsel in New York City in 1984,7 calls 
Legal Aid "a bunch of ideologues" who practice "objection law" (p. 
102). Another attorney with the Corporation Counsel remarks, "If all 
these kids are here because they're victims of their backgrounds, be-
cause the homes they come from are neglectful or abusive - then why 
does Legal Aid fight to put them back in those homes by paroling 
them to their families?" (p. 93). 
Given her victim's-rights perspective, Kramer's critique of Legal 
Aid comes as no surprise: She thinks procedure needlessly allows 
juveniles to escape accountability. James Payne, who, Kramer care-
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). One year earlier the Court had applied due process standards to juve-
nile proceedings for the first time, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
5. 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 56-57 (requiring adequate notice of charges, right to counsel, privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and rights to confrontation and cross-examination). 
6. The Legal Aid Society, a private agency, provides representation to most juveniles in New 
York's Family Court. P. 85. 
7. P. 98. "Corporation Counsel" are New York City's "presentment" (prosecuting) attor-
neys in Family Court. Pp. 85-86. 
1318 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1316 
fully notes, "[a]s a black man, ... can say things no white would be 
comfortable saying ... " (p. 99), shares her concern: "There are too 
many people around here bleeding over these kids, encouraging them 
to believe they got a raw deal .... [Y]ou can't say it's poverty that 
causes crime .... [O]nly a fraction of [poor youth] ever commit a 
crime" (pp. 99-100). 
Unfortunately, Kramer barely pauses.to consider how procedural 
protections might be preserved for innocent youth who would get 
crushed without them. Such abuse was what spawned the Gault deci-
sion in the first place. 8 And the type of reasoning indulged in by 
James Payne, in which crime appears remediable just by cracking the 
whip on incorrigibles, really diverts attention from the miserable, vio-
lent realities suffered by most juvenile offenders from birth; it attacks 
symptoms and ignores causes. Though tougher juvenile procedure 
may put more guilty offenders in jail, it will not stop juvenile crime. 
Kramer's retributive theme results also from the fact that her 
study focuses on the most violent subpopulation of juvenile offenders. 
An earlier study of New York's juvenile system done by Peter Pres-
cott9 expressed much more sympathy for the majority of juvenile of-
fenders, characterizing them as misguided children suffering under the 
weight of the system. Prescott's study is similar to Kramer's in many 
respects, including the perception of New York's Family Court as a 
bleak, ineffective institution. But as one reviewer put it: "[Prescott's] 
concern is for abused, innocent children who receive no help from the 
court or institutions created for their benefit. They are the majority 
among the young in trouble with the law, not the violent minority 
widely publicized."10 
Kramer, however, largely ignores the nondangerous majority; she 
concerns herself with the rapists and murderers. She repeatedly 
stresses how studies conducted in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 11 and 
8. For example, the Gault petitioner, a fifteen-year-old boy, was committed to an industrial 
training school until age 21 for making an obscene telephone call. The juvenile proceedings, as 
described by the Supreme Court, were muddled at best. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 1-2, 5-9. See also 
Comment, In Re Gault: Children are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204 (1967), which describes 
some unjust outcomes resulting from the pre-Gault lack of procedural protections, such as the 
seven-year commitment of one boy for telephoning a bomb scare to the police. Id. at 1208 (citing 
State ex rel Toney v. Mills, 144 W. Va. 257, 107 S.E.2d 772 (1959)). As Justice Fortas remarked 
in the Gault opinion: "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, 
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure .•.• 
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in ... unfairness to 
individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of rem-
edy." 387 U.S. at 18-20. 
9. P. PRESCOTT, THE CHILD SAVERS: JUVENILE JUSTICE OBSERVED (1981). 
10. Book Review, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Apr. 10, 1981, at 64 (reviewing P. PRESCOTT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS, supra note 9). 
11. M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972). 
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Columbus, Ohio, 12 have revealed that a small, concentrated subgroup 
of repeat juvenile criminals carry out the majority of violent juvenile 
crime. 13 These chronic, violent offenders are viewed by many experts 
as beyond rehabilitation. As one counselor put it: "Forget right and 
wrong; it's too late for developing a conscience" (p. 189). So, in one 
sense, Kramer's belief in punishment is espoused not so much as a 
morally appropriate response, but as a last-resort method of behavior 
modification. 
Despite the harsh, often retributive attitude she displays toward 
violent youth throughout her book, Kramer does recognize and de-
scribe the main underlying cause of violence: the disintegration of 
family. 14 The home life of one fifteen-year-old involved in a brutal 
gang rape exemplifies the tragedy: 
The history is depressingly predictable. Mother, sixteen at time of 
his birth. Father unknown. Shunted around among various relatives. 
Mother in a series of relationships with sometimes brutal men, treated 
for heroin addiction .... A life lived mostly on the streets, occasionally 
turning up at some relative's for a night or two, sometimes returning to 
the apartment mother shares with current man, sometimes being kicked 
out. [p. 79] 
Several psychological experts interviewed late in the book describe 
how shallow or nonexistent emotional bonding during childhood cre-
ates the randomly violent behavior found in juvenile criminals. When 
children are neither nurtured nor trained in character, unusual, some-
times horrible behavior results. As Dr. Richard Garmise, clinic direc-
tor of Mental Health Services in New York County, put it, "[A] lot of .. 
the violence is adaptive for the kid. They weren't brought up not to be 
violent" (pp. 197-98, 213). 
At the end of her book, Kramer offers a range of reform proposals 
she believes will protect society from violent youth. To her credit, she 
briefly discusses the need for community-based solutions to the under-
lying causes of violence. Yet her predominant concern lies with 
changing juvenile justice institutions and procedures. She wants juve-
nile court proceedings opened to public scrutiny, believing that 
"[p]ublic awareness is what drives legislation, and an informed com-
munity is in a better position to protect the interests of the many as 
well as the few" (p. 249). She wants juvenile arrest and court records, 
12. D. HAMPARIAN, R. SHUSTER, S. DINITZ & J. CoNRAD, THE VIOLENT FEW: A STUDY 
OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1978). 
13. See, e.g., pp. 196, 250, 287. The Wolfgang study found that as few as 6% of the juveniles 
studied committed over 70% of the violent juvenile crimes; the Hamparian study found that 
33% of juveniles with at least one arrest for a major violent crime were involved in 68% of the 
violent juvenile crime arrests. See pp. 280.81 (construing DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT, 
supra note 11, and THE VIOLENT FEW, supra note 12). 
14. A recent study by the U.S. Department of Justice found that nearly 75% of juvenile 
criminals currently in detention come from broken homes. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1988, at 
Al5, col 1. 
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now sealed against disclosure, opened so that hard-core offenders can 
be more easily identified and isolated (pp. 248-50, 265). For similar 
reasons she wants the juvenile and adult criminal systems unified, so 
that one system can be held accountable for tracking and treating 
chronic offenders (p. 251). The core of her reform package, however, 
focuses on providing the immediate deterrence she believes is the only 
way to control violent repeat offenders. Her main suggestions here are 
to reduce the bureaucratic time lag between arrest and disposition (p. 
264), to allow "less obsessive focus on procedural technicalities at the 
expense of factfinding" (p. 264), and to base penalties on fully accessi-
ble prior records as well as on the severity of the crime (pp. 264-65). 
Kramer obviously wrote her book with a wide audience in mind. 
She wants social reform; she wants violent youth punished, and she 
describes gruesome victimization to arouse a following. The book 
warrants reading because it provides colorful and candid insider per-
spectives on a fearsome problem. Because the book lacks legal sophis-
tication, however, it may leave the reader dissatisfied. Without even a 
moderately thorough exploration of constitutional issues, Kramer 
leaves us wondering how pre-Gault abuses might be avoided in her 
world of swift and certain punishment. 
- Patrick Gallagher 
